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I

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS1

On 7 February 2011, President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL), Antonio Cassese, issued a general invitation to, inter alia, nongovernmental organizations and academic institutions to submit
briefs on speciﬁc issues related to the 15 preliminary questions
addressed to the judges of the Appeals Chamber pursuant to
Rule 68(G) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). On 11
February 2011, the War Crimes Research Oﬃce (WCRO) of the
American University Washington College of Law submitted an
amicus curiae brief under Rule 131 of the RPE addressing the speciﬁc
question of whether cumulative charging is an accepted practice
before international criminal bodies.
Citing jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal
On Behalf of the War Crimes Research Oﬃce of the American University
Washington College of Law.
* Professorial Lecturer-in-Residence, Director, War Crimes Research Oﬃce,
American University Washington College of Law.
** Assistant Director, War Crimes Research Oﬃce, American University Washington College of Law.
*** The brief (i.e. excluding Susana SáCouto’s introductory remarks) is published
as submitted to the Special Tribunal to Lebanon.
1

These introductory remarks were drafted by Susana SáCouto’ speciﬁcally for inclusion in this volume of Criminal Law Forum and did not form part of the original brief.
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for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts of Cambodia, the WCRO argued that
cumulative charging is a widely accepted practice before international
criminal bodies, even where one charge is fully subsumed in another
charge.2 As the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY explained, the practice
is warranted because, prior to trial, the Prosecutor may not be able to
determine with certainty which charges will ultimately be proven, and
because the Trial Chamber is in a better position to determine the
appropriate charge after the presentation of all of the evidence.3 Indeed, absent the ability to charge cumulatively, an accused might be
wrongfully acquitted if, despite evidence showing the accused was
guilty of a crime, the prosecution chooses to characterize the same
conduct as a diﬀerent crime which it is ultimately unable to prove.
Furthermore, the WCRO brief noted that permitting multiple charges based on the same conduct allows a Trial Chamber to enter
multiple convictions based on that conduct where necessary to fully
reﬂect the culpability of the accused.4 Although an accused cannot be
punished more than once for the same criminal conduct, as an ICTY
Trial Chamber has observed, avoiding this can be accomplished at
the conviction – rather than the charging – stage by entering multiple
convictions against an accused only for charges that contain materially distinct elements.5
Nevertheless, in its Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law:
Terrorism, Conspiracy Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging,
issued less than a week after the WCRO submitted its brief to the
Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber of the STL found that while the ad hoc
tribunals have favored the practice of cumulative charging,6 a diﬀerent

2

War Crimes Research Oﬃce, Amicus Curiae Brief on the Practice of Cumulative
Charging before International Criminal Bodies, Case No. STL-11-01/I, (10 February
2011) [hereinafter, War Crimes Research Oﬃce, Amicus Curiae Brief], paras. 6–7.
3

Prosecutor v. Delalic´, et al., (Appeals Judgment) Case No. IT-96-21-A, (20
February 2001), para. 400.
4

War Crimes Research Oﬃce, Amicus Curiae Brief, (n 1 above), para. 8.

5

Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ & Martinovic´, (Decision on Vinko Martinovic´’s Objection
to the Amended Indictment and Mladen Naletilic´’s Preliminary Motion to the
Amended Indictment) Case No. IT-98-34 (14 February 2001) (note that this decision
contains no paragraph numbers).
6
UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Interlocutory Decision on
the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative
Charging, STL-11-01/I, 16 February 2011 [hereinafter STL Appeals Chamber
Decision], para. 292.
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practice is Ôemerging’ at the International Criminal Court (ICC).7 The
Chamber based this ﬁnding on the case against Jean-Pierre Bemba, in
which the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the cumulative charging
approach of the Prosecutor, holding that Ôas a matter of fairness and
expeditiousness of the proceedings, only distinct crimes may justify a
cumulative charging approach’.8 Following the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
approach in Bemba, the STL Appeals Chamber concluded that in
conﬁrming the indictment, the Pre-Trial Judge Ôshould be particularly
careful to allow cumulative charging only when separate elements of
the charged oﬀences make these oﬀences truly distinct’.9
The Appeals Chamber’s decision appears to overlook the reasons
why, as the WCRO argued in its brief, the Bemba decision does not
aﬀect the general acceptance of the practice of cumulative charging
before international criminal bodies, even where one charge is fully
subsumed in another charge. First, the Bemba decision was issued by
a single Pre-Trial Chamber in a single case. Notably, leave to appeal
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision was rejected.10 Thus, the decision of
the Bemba Chamber has in no way been sanctioned by the ICC
Appeals Chamber. Furthermore, a diﬀerent Pre-Trial Chamber permitted the practice of cumulative charging in the context of the case
against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, ﬁnding that there were
reasonable grounds to believe Bashir had committed both the crime
against humanity of murder and the crime against humanity of
extermination even though the former is subsumed by the latter
where, as in that case, the two crimes are based on the same
underlying acts.11 More signiﬁcantly, the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber
expressly recognized that it was deviating from the practice of
other international criminal bodies in disallowing cumulative
charging, justifying this on the grounds that Regulation 55 of the
7

Ibid., paras. 291–292.

8

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08, (Pre-Trial Chamber, 15 June 2009), para. 202.
9

STL Appeals Chamber Decision (n. 5 above), para. 298.

10

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘‘Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’’), ICC-01/05-01/08-532 (18 September 2009), paras. 32–35.
11

Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Decision on the Prosecution’s
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC02/05-01/09-3 (4 March 2009), paras. 92–96.
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ICC’s Regulations of the Court allows Ôthe Trial Chamber [to] recharacterise a crime to give it the most appropriate legal characterization’.12 Although the STL Appeals Chamber recognized that the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Bemba had not been reviewed by the
ICC Appeals Chamber,13 it mentioned neither the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the Bashir case nor the fact that there is no equivalent to the ICC’s Regulation 55 under the rules and regulations
governing the STL.
Still, the Appeals Chamber’s decision leaves open the possibility of
charging the accused with two crimes based on the same conduct
– even where one charge is fully subsumed in another charge – if the
prosecution alleges the crimes ‘‘in the alternative’’, so that in the event
that the primary charge is unsuccessful, prosecutors can then rely on
secondary (alternate) charges’’.14 Indeed, while the Chamber suggests
that the practice of cumulative charging is not uniform before international criminal bodies, it notes that nothing in the jurisprudence of
the tribunals prevents alternative charging by prosecutors.15 Thus, the
Chamber concludes that the ÔTribunal should prefer alternative
charging where a [sic] conduct would not permit multiple convictions’,16 that is, where the crimes do not have materially distinct elements. In other words, it appears that where one crime encompasses
another and both are based on the same conduct, the prosecutors at
the STL can still charge both as long as they do so Ôin the alternative’.
In the end, it appears that the decision does not diﬀer substantially
from what the WCRO argued was the general practice relating to
cumulative charging before international criminal bodies. Although
the decision requires the prosecution to be more precise by articulating whether it intends to pursue conviction for several crimes based
on the same conduct or to rely on charges Ôin the alternative’, it
permits the prosecution to charge the accused with several crimes
based on the same conduct whether or not the crimes have materially
distinct elements.
A more striking aspect of the decision is the suggestion that the PreTrial Judge discourage the submission of charges even where they are
12
Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (n. 7 above),
para. 203.
13

STL Appeals Chamber Decision, (n. 5 above), para. 292.

14

Ibid., para. 286.

15

Ibid., para. 293.

16

Ibid., at Disposition para. 15.
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Ôformally distinct’ unless they are Ôaimed at protecting substantially
diﬀerent values’.17 While this practice may, as the Chamber suggests,
Ôenable more eﬃcient proceedings while avoiding unnecessary burdens
on the defence’,18 it appears to shift the responsibility for framing the
charges against the accused from the prosecution to the Pre-Trial
Judge. This seems contrary to the statute of the STL, which makes
clear that it is the prosecution that bears responsibility for Ôthe
investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the crimes
falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal’.19 At the same
time, the STL statute limits the authority of the Pre-Trial Judge.
Pursuant to Article 18(1) of the statute, Ô[i]f satisﬁed that a prima facie
case has been established by the Prosecutor, [the Pre-Trial Judge] shall
conﬁrm the indictment. If he or she is not so satisﬁed, the indictment
shall be dismissed’.20 Although Rule 68(I) of the RPE permits the PreTrial Judge to Ôrequest or permit the Prosecutor to present additional
material in support of any or all counts’,21 this language diﬀers from
the rules of the ICTY, which expressly permit the Trial Chamber,
Ôhaving heard the parties and in the interest of a fair and expeditious
trial, [to] direct the Prosecutor to select the counts in the indictment on
which to proceed’.22 While the Chamber’s decision does not purport
to give the Pre-Trial Judge the authority to direct the prosecution to
select particular charges, it does indicate that the Pre-Trial Judge
should strongly dissuade the prosecution from pursuing charges with
17

Ibid., para. 299.

18

Ibid., para. 299.

19

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S/RES/1757 (2007), Article 11.

20

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S/RES/1757 (2007), Article 18.1
[emphasis added].
21
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, STL/BD/
2009/01/Rev. 3, adopted 20 March 2009, amended 10 November 2010 and corrected
29 November 2010, Rule 68(I).
22

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.43 (2009), entered into force 14 March 1994,
amendments adopted 24 July 2009, Rule 73bis(E). It is worth noting that this language was adopted in the unique context of discussions relating to the ‘‘completion
strategy’’ for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. See
Letter dated 15 November 2006 from the President of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/898, at
3–4, 16 November 2006 (discussing Rule 73bis(E) in the context of ÔMeasures taken
to implement the [ICTY’s] completion strategy’).
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materially distinct elements if Ôthey do not in practical terms further
the achievement of truth and justice through the criminal process’.23
As such, it appears to endow the Pre-Trial Judge with greater supervisory authority over the prosecution than was envisioned by the
drafters of either the STL statute or the RPE.

23

STL Appeals Chamber Decision, (n. 5 above), para. 299.
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INTRODUCTION
1. The War Crimes Research Oﬃce at the American University
Washington College of Law submits this amicus curiae brief
pursuant to Rule 131 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(RPE) of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and pursuant
to a general invitation issued by President Cassese on 7 February
2011, in which he invited, inter alia, non-governmental organizations and academic institutions to submit briefs on speciﬁc
issues related to the ﬁfteen preliminary questions addressed to the
judges of the Appeals Chamber pursuant to Rule 68(G) of the
RPE. The brief addresses the speciﬁc question of whether
cumulative charging is an accepted practice before international
criminal bodies.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
2. Cumulative charging is a widely accepted practice in international
criminal bodies, even where one charge is fully subsumed in another
charge. The ﬁrst bodies established to try individuals suspected of
committing international crimes in the wake of World War II each
entertained charges of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity based on the same underlying conduct. Subsequent international tribunals, including the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Extraordinary Chambers for the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have similarly entertained multiple
charges against an accused based on the same underlying acts.
Importantly, this has been the case even where one charge is fully
subsumed in another charge, as in the case where an individual is
charged with both extermination and murder as a crime against
humanity based on the same underlying conduct. The Appeals
Chamber for the ICTY has explained that the practice of cumulative charging is warranted because, prior to trial, the Prosecutor
may not be able to determine with certainty which charges will
ultimately be proven, and because the Trial Chamber is in a better
position to determine the appropriate charge after the presentation
of all of the evidence. Furthermore, permitting multiple charges
based on the same conduct is critical because the multiple charges
will enable the Trial Chamber, where appropriate, to enter multiple convictions based on that conduct, at least with respect to
charges that contain materially distinct elements. Notably, the
post-World War II tribunals, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and
the ECCC have each permitted multiple convictions based on the
same conduct, so long as each oﬀense contains a materially distinct
element, recognizing that multiple convictions are often necessary
to fully reﬂect the culpability of the accused.
3. The decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal
Court in the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo on
the subject of cumulative charging does not aﬀect the general acceptance of the practice of cumulative charging before international
criminal bodies. A single Pre-Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) held in one case – the Bemba case – that only
‘‘distinct crimes’’ could justify a cumulative charging approach,
meaning that each crime charged must contain a materially distinct
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element not contained in the other. Notably, however, another
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC permitted the practice of cumulative charging in the context of the case against Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, even where one charge was fully
subsumed in another charge. Furthermore, the Bemba Pre-Trial
Chamber itself expressly acknowledged that cumulative charging
is practiced by both national courts and international tribunals,
and it declined to apply the test applied by these other bodies
based on the unique context of the ICC. Speciﬁcally, in the
opinion of the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber, the ICC is diﬀerent
from other international criminal bodies in that it allows for the
Chambers, rather than the Prosecutor, to determine the most
appropriate legal characterization of the relevant facts. The
Chamber supported its position by noting that Regulation 55 of
the ICC’s Regulations of the Court permits the Trial Chamber to
re-characterize charges brought to trial, and reasoning that,
because of this regulation, there is no need for the Prosecution to
present all possible characterizations of a crime in order to
ensure conviction. Because the Trial Chamber of the STL lacks
the power to amend the legal characterization of charges during
trial, the Bemba decision on cumulative charging should not be
applied in the context of the STL.
4. In the event that the STL applies the Bemba approach to
cumulative charging, the Tribunal should allow multiple charges
based on the same evidence where each charge contains a
materially distinct element, even if the same evidence is used to
satisfy each charge. Importantly, under the test articulated by the
Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber, cumulative charging is appropriate so
long as each crime allegedly committed contains a materially
distinct element not contained in the other. Nevertheless, in
applying its stated test to the facts of the case before it, the
Chamber apparently determined that charges should be deemed
inappropriately ‘‘cumulative’’ – even if each charge contains an
element materially distinct from the other – if the same evidence
is put forth to establish those elements. Thus, the Chamber
determined that the charges of rape as a crime against humanity
and torture as a crime against humanity were inappropriately
cumulative because the same evidence – i.e., acts of rape – was
used to satisfy the elements of both crimes, even though each of
the crimes contains materially distinct elements. As detailed below, such an approach is unwarranted as both a matter of law
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and practice. In fact, as stated above, permitting multiple charges
based on the same conduct is critical to enabling the Trial
Chamber to enter multiple convictions based on that conduct
where necessary to fully reﬂect an accused’s criminality.

ARGUMENTS
A.

Cumulative Charging is a Widely Accepted Practice before
International Criminal Bodies, Even Where One Charge
is Fully Subsumed in Another Charge

5. The ﬁrst bodies established to try individuals suspected of committing international crimes – the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE), and the tribunals set up under Control Council
Law No. 10 – each entertained charges of crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity based on the same
underlying conduct.1
6. Indeed, the IMTFE described the practice of bringing charges that
were Ôcumulative or alternative’ as Ôcommon’.2 Furthermore, although that same tribunal declined to enter convictions on multiple
charges where certain charges were fully subsumed within other

1

See, e.g., United States v. Herman Goering, et al., reprinted in 1 Trial of the Major
War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 65 (1947) (ÔThe prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three [violations of the laws and
customs of war] as also constituting crimes against humanity’.); Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1 November 1948), at 34–35,
available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/index.html (noting,
without disapproval, that the Prosecution had alleged 756 separate charges in respect
to crimes against peace because a number of the charges were cumulative or alternative); United States v. Oswald Pohl, et al., reprinted in V Trial of War Criminals
Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals 204, 207 (W. S. Hein ed., 1997) (charging
the defendants with war crimes and crimes against humanity based on the same acts
Ôinvolving the commission of atrocities and oﬀenses against persons and property,
including, but not limited to, plunder of public and private property, murder, torture; illegal imprisonment, and enslavement and deportation to slave labor of, and
brutalities, atrocities, and other inhumane and criminal acts against thousands of
persons’); United States v. Karl Brandt, et al., reprinted in I Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals 11, 16 (W. S. Hein ed., 1997).
2

Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, (n. 1 above)
at 35.
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charges, it stressed that the multiple charges were valid even where
one or more charges lacked a distinct material element.3
7. Subsequent international criminal tribunals, including the ICTY,
the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC have each similarly entertained multiple charges against an accused based on the same
underlying acts.4 Importantly, as seen with the IMTFE, these
subsequent international criminal bodies have permitted cumulative charging even where one charge is fully subsumed in
another charge. For instance, a tribunal may entertain charges of
both extermination as a crime against humanity and murder as a
crime against humanity based on the same underlying conduct,5
even though each element of murder as a crime against humanity
is subsumed in the crime of extermination as a crime against

3
Ibid., at 32–33 (ÔA conspiracy to wage aggressive or unlawful war arises when
two or more persons enter into an agreement to commit that crime. Thereafter, in
furtherance of the conspiracy, follows planning and preparing for such war. Those
who participate at this stage may be either original conspirators or later adherents. If
the latter adopt the purpose of the conspiracy and plan and prepare for its fulﬁllment
they become conspirators. For this reason, as all the accused are charged with the
conspiracies, we do not consider it necessary in respect of those we may ﬁnd guilty of
conspiracy to enter convictions also for planning and preparing. In other words,
although we do not question the validity of the charges we do not think it necessary in
respect of any defendants who may be found guilty of conspiracy to take into
consideration nor to enter convictions upon counts [relating to planning or preparing
for the aggressive war].’) (emphasis added).
4

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic´, et al., (Appeals Judgment) Case No. IT-96-21-A
(20 February 2001), para. 400; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, (Trial Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999), paras. 108–119; Prosecutor v. Musema,
(Trial Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000), paras. 289–299;
Prosecutor v. Sesay, et al., (Appeals Judgment) SCSCL-04-15-A (26 October 2009),
para. 1192; Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, et al., (Closing Order) Case File No.: 002/1909-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (15 September 2010), paras. 1373–1390. Note that in an early
decision by the ICTR, a Trial Chamber held that Ô[c]umulative charging is acceptable
only where the oﬀences have diﬀering elements or where laws in question protect
diﬀering social interests’, and thus rejected the Prosecution’s charges of crimes
against humanity on the ground that those charges were subsumed in the charge of
genocide. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindanda, (Trial Judgment) ICTR-95-I (21
May 1999), paras. 625–650. However, the Tribunal has since upheld the practice of
cumulative charging, even where one charge is fully subsumed within another charge
that is based on the same conduct. See Rutaganda, (Trial Judgment and Sentence)
above, para. 110; Musema, (Trial Judgment and Sentence) above, para. 296.
5

See, e.g., Sesay, et al., (Appeals Judgment) (n. 4 above) para., 1192.
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humanity.6 This is in fact exactly what has occurred in the context of Case 002 before the ECCC, in which the accused have
been charged with the crimes against humanity of murder and
extermination based on the same set of facts relating to persons
killed at particular execution sites and worksites, as well as those
killed during the forced transfer of populations.7 In addition, as
discussed further below, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC has
issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir
containing charges of both murder and extermination as crimes
against humanity based on the same underlying acts.8
8. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic´ explained
that the practice of cumulative charging is warranted because,
prior to trial, Ôit is not possible to determine to a certainty which of
the charges brought against an accused will be proven’ and
because the ÔTrial Chamber is better poised, after the parties’
presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of the charges may
6
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, (Trial Judgment) Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T
(22 January 2004), para. 686 (Ô[A]part from the question of scale, the essence of the
crimes of murder as a Crime against Humanity and extermination as a Crime against
Humanity is the same’).
7

Nuon Chea, et al., (Closing Order) (n. 4 above), paras. 1373–1390. In the ﬁrst
case before the ECCC, Case 001, the Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to articulate a test
for cumulative charging that would only permit multiple charges where each charge
contained a distinct material element. See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav ‘‘Duch,’’
(Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicating Kaing Guek Eav Alias
‘‘Duch,’’) Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02) (5 December 2008),
paras. 51–107 (reversing a holding by the Co-Investigating Judges that certain acts
could not be charged as both international and domestic crimes based on a ﬁnding
that the domestic crimes were not fully subsumed in the international crimes).
However, in that case, the issue was whether the same conduct could be charged as
both an international and a domestic crime, and the fact was that the relevant
charges under examination each contained materially distinct elements. Ibid. Thus,
the Pre-Trial Chamber did not directly address the issue whether two charges could
be brought simultaneously if one of the charges was fully subsumed in the other.
Furthermore, in determining that both international and domestic charges would be
allowed based on the same conduct, the Chamber cited favorably to the Ôjurisprudence of the ad hoc international tribunals hold[ing] that it is permissible in international criminal proceedings to include in indictments diﬀerent legal oﬀences in
relation to the same acts’, suggesting it was adopting the practice of the ICTY and
ICTR with respect to cumulative charging as its own. Ibid., para. 87. This suggestion
seems to be conﬁrmed by the approach of the Co-Investigating Judges in Case 002,
although the judges do not expressly acknowledge that they are adopting an approach to cumulative charging that allows multiple charges not containing materially
distinct elements.
8

See infra n. 43 et seq. and accompanying text.
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be retained, based upon the suﬃciency of the evidence’.9 The
SCSL Appeals Chamber has adopted similar reasoning, upholding the practice of cumulative charging based on the fact that,
Ôprior to the presentation of all the evidence, it is not possible to
determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an
accused will be proven, if any’.10 This is particularly true in the
context of international criminal tribunals, as Ôthe crimes over
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction are frequently broad and yet
to be clariﬁed in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal’.11
9. Furthermore, permitting multiple charges based on the
same conduct is critical because the multiple charges will
enable the Trial Chamber, where appropriate, to enter multiple
convictions based on that conduct, at least with respect
to charges that contain materially distinct elements. Notably,
the post-World War II tribunals,12 the ICTY,13 the

9

Delalic´, et al., (Appeals Judgment) (n. 4 above), para. 400. See also Attila Bogdan,
ÔCumulative Charges, Convictions and Sentencing at the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, (2002) 3 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 1, n.
123, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2002/1.html (quoting the Kvocka, et al. Trial Chamber as holding: ÔIssues of cumulative charging are best
decided at the end of the case. So long as the proof adduced by the Prosecution could
satisfy a reasonable court beyond reasonable doubt that the elements of one of the
allegedly cumulative charges had been satisﬁed, the case continues’).
10

Prosecutor v. Brima, et al., (Appeals Judgment) SCSL-2004-16-A (22 February
2008), n. 327.
11
Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ & Martinovic´, (Decision on Vinko Martinovic’s Objection to the Amended Indictment and Mladen Naletilic’s Preliminary Motion to the
Amended Indictment) Case No. IT-98-34 (14 February 2001) (note that this decision
contains no paragraph numbers).
12

See, e.g., Goering, et al., (n. 1 above) at 254 (holding that, Ôfrom the beginning of
the war in 1939[,] war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also crimes
against humanity’) (emphasis added); Brandt, et al., (n. 1 above) at 174 (reasoning
that, as long as war crimes were Ôalleged to have been ‘‘committed against the civilian
populations of occupied territories and prisoners of war,’’’ and crimes against
humanity were Ôalleged to have been ‘‘committed against German civilians and
nationals of other countries,’’’ an accused could be convicted under both headings,
even if the underlying conduct was the same).
13

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic´, (Appeals Judgment) Case. No. IT-98-33-A (19
April 2004), para. 218 (explaining that, under the Ôestablished jurisprudence’ of the
ICTY, Ômultiple convictions entered under diﬀerent statutory provision, but based
on the same conduct, are permissible’ where Ôeach statutory provision has a materially distinct element not contained within the other’).
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ICTR,14 the SCSL,15 and the ECCC16 have each permitted multiple convictions based on the same conduct, so long as each offense contains a materially distinct element. The rationale for
permitting cumulative convictions, as set forth by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber and endorsed by the SCSL Appeals Chamber,
is that Ômultiple convictions serve to describe the full culpability of
a particular accused or provide a complete picture of his criminal
conduct’.17 Indeed, as Judge Mohammed Shahabudden once
observed: ÔTo convict of one oﬀence only is to leave unnoticed the
injury to the other interest of international society and to fail to
describe the true extent of the criminal conduct of the accused’.18
10. Finally, as observed by an ICTY Trial Chamber, Ôthe fundamental harm to be guarded against by the prohibition of
cumulative charges is to ensure that an accused is not punished
more than once in respect of the same criminal act’ and this can
be done at the convictions or sentencing stage.19

14

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Trial Chamber Sentence) Case No. ICTR-964-S (2
September 1998), para. 468 (concluding, Ô[o]n the basis of national and international
law and jurisprudence’, that Ôit is acceptable to convict the accused of two oﬀences in
relation to the same set of facts… where the oﬀences have diﬀerent elements’).
15
Sesay et al., (Appeals Judgment) (n. 14 above), para. 1191 (holding Ô[i]t is
permissible to enter cumulative convictions under diﬀerent statutory provisions for
the same criminal act if each statutory provision has a Ômaterially distinct element’
that is not contained in the other statutory provision’).
16

Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav ‘‘Duch,’’ (Trial Judgment) Case File/Dossier No.
001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC (26 July 2010), para. 560 (citing the ICTY Appeals
Chamber for the proposition that Ômultiple convictions entered under diﬀerent
statutory provision, but based on the same conduct, are permissible’ where Ôeach
statutory provision has a materially distinct element not contained within the other’).
17

Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ & Martinovic´, (Appeals Judgment), Case No. IT-98-34 (3
May 2006), para. 585; Brima, et al., (Appeals Judgment) (n. 10 above), para. 215
(quoting the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Naletilic´ & Martinovic´).
18
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, (Appeals Judgment, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Shahabudden) Case No. IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999), para. 41.
19

Ibid. It is worth noting that many domestic jurisdictions also permit the practice
of cumulative charging. See, e.g., Bogdan, (n. 9 above) (discussing the approach of
both common law and Romano-Germanic jurisdictions to the issue of cumulative
charging); H.S. Wills, ÔCumulative Convictions and the Double Jeopardy Rule:
Pursuing Justice at the ICTY and the ICTR’ (2003) 17 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 341, 372.
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The Cumulative Charging Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II
of the International Criminal Court in the Bemba Case Does Not
Aﬀect the General Acceptance of the Practice of Cumulative
Charging before International Criminal Bodies

B.1 The Bemba Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges
11. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was transferred to the custody of the
ICC in The Hague in July 2008.20 Subsequently, the parties
began to prepare for the conﬁrmation of charges hearing, by
which the Pre-Trial Chamber must determine whether Ôthere is
suﬃcient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe
that the person committed each of the crimes charged’.21
Among the charges put forward by the Prosecution against
Bemba were the following:
[f]rom on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, Jean-Pierre Bemba
committed… crimes against humanity through acts of rape upon civilian men,
women and children in the Central African Republic, in violation of [Article]
7(1)(g)… of the Rome Statute22;
[f]rom on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, Jean-Pierre Bemba
committed… [torture as a crime against humanity] by inﬂicting severe physical
or mental pain or suﬀering through acts of rape or other forms of sexual
violence, upon civilian men, women and children in the Central African
Republic, in violation of [Article] 7(l)(f)… of the Rome Statute23;
[f]rom on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, Jean-Pierre Bemba
committed… war crimes through acts of rape upon civilian men, women and
children in the Central African Republic, in violation of [Article] 8(2)(e)(vi)…
of the Rome Statute24; and
[f]rom on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, Jean-Pierre Bemba
committed… war crimes by humiliating, degrading or otherwise violating the

20

Ibid., para. 4.

21

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, adopted
on 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, Article 61(7).
22

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Public Redacted Version, Amended
Document Containing the Charges, ICC-01/05-01/08-169-Anx3A) (17 October
2008), at 38, annexed to Prosecution’s Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges and Amended List of Evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08-169 (17
October 2008).
23

Ibid., at 39.

24

Ibid., at 38.
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dignity of civilian men, women and children in the Central African Republic,
in violation of [Article] 8(2)(c)(ii)… of the Rome Statute.25

12. The conﬁrmation of charges hearing took place in January 2009
and, six months later, the Chamber issued its decision regarding
the charges.26 With regard to the crimes against humanity
charged by the Prosecution, the Chamber found that there was
Ôsuﬃcient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe
that acts of murder and rape constituting crimes against
humanity… were committed as part of a widespread attack
directed against the civilian population’ of the Central African
Republic during the relevant time period.27 However, the
Chamber went on to say that it Ôreject[ed] the cumulative
charging approach of the Prosecutor’ and thus declined to
conﬁrm the charge of torture as a crime against humanity.28
13. Explaining its position, the Chamber stated that the Prosecution
Ôused a cumulative charging approach by characterizing [the
crime against humanity of torture] as ‘‘[torture] through acts of
rape or other forms of sexual violence’’’ and by Ôaver[ring] that
the same criminal conduct can be prosecuted under two diﬀer25

Ibid., at 40.

26

See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 June 2009), para. 16. Note that,
approximately two months after the close of the conﬁrmation hearing, the Pre-Trial
Chamber issued a decision adjourning the conﬁrmation process pursuant to Article
61(7)(c)(ii), the provision of the Rome Statute authorizing the Pre-Trial Chamber to
Ôrequest the Prosecutor to consider… [a]mending a charge because the evidence
submitted appears to establish a diﬀerent crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’.
Ibid., para. 15. Speciﬁcally, the Chamber requested that the Prosecution consider
amending the mode of responsibility under which it had charged Mr. Bemba to
include allegations that the accused was responsible for the alleged crimes under a
theory of superior responsibility. Ibid. In line with the Chamber’s request, the
Prosecution ﬁled an Amended Document Containing the Charges on 30 March 2009,
including allegations involving Mr. Bemba’s liability as a superior pursuant to
Article 28 of the Rome Statute as an alternative to his individual responsibility
pursuant to Article 25 of the Rome Statute. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, (Prosecution’s Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges,
Amended List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory
Evidence) ICC-01/05-01/08-395 (Oﬃce of the Prosecutor, 30 March 2009).
27

Bemba, (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) (n. 26 above),
para. 72.
28

Ibid.

PRACTICE OF CUMULATIVE CHARGING

425

ent counts, namely the count of torture as well as the count of
rape, the acts of rape being the instrument of torture’.29 It then
Ôacknowledge[d] that the cumulative charging approach is followed by national courts and international tribunals under
certain conditions’,30 citing, inter alia, a number of decisions by
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda in which those tribunals recognized that the
Prosecutor may be justiﬁed in bringing cumulative charges.31
Nevertheless, the Chamber went on to hold that, in its opinion,
the ICC is unique because it allows for Ôthe Chamber to characterise the facts put forward by the Prosecutor’,32 rather than
leaving it to the Prosecutor to determine the legal characterization of charges. The Chamber explained:
[T]he ICC legal framework diﬀers from that of the ad hoc tribunals, since under
[R]egulation 55 of the Regulations [of the Court33], the Trial Chamber may
re-characterise a crime to give it the most appropriate legal characterisation.
Therefore, before the ICC, there is no need for the Prosecutor to adopt a
cumulative charging approach and present all possible characterisations in
order to ensure that at least one will be retained by the Chamber.34

14. In light of this position, the Chamber held that, Ôas a matter of
fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings, only distinct
crimes may justify a cumulative charging approach and, ultimately, be conﬁrmed as charges’, and that this is Ôonly possible
if each statutory provision allegedly breached in relation to one
and the same conduct requires at least one additional material
element not contained in the other’.35

29

Ibid., para. 199.

30

Ibid., para. 200 (internal citations omitted).

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid., para. 201.

33

Regulation 55, which provides that, under certain circumstances, a Trial
Chamber may Ôchange the legal characterisation of facts… without exceeding the
facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges’, is discussed in further detail below. See infra n. 87 et seq. and accompanying
text.
34

Bemba, (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) (n. 26 above),
para. 203.
35

Ibid., para. 202, n. 277.
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15. Applying its adopted framework to the Prosecution’s charges
against Mr. Bemba, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that Ôthe speciﬁc material elements of the act of torture, namely severe pain
and suﬀering and control by the perpetrator over the person, are
also the inherent speciﬁc material elements of the act of rape’.36
However, because the act of rape Ôrequires the additional speciﬁc material element of penetration’, the Chamber held that
rape was Ôthe most appropriate legal characterisation in this
particular case’.37
16. The Chamber made similar ﬁndings with regard to the Prosecution’s charge of outrages upon personal dignity as a war
crime.38 As an initial matter, the Chamber noted that the
Prosecution failed to specify in its Document Containing the
Charges (DCC) Ôthe facts upon which [it] bases the charge of
outrages upon personal dignity’.39 The Chamber then explained
that, in its opinion, Ômost of the facts presented by the Prosecutor at the [Conﬁrmation] Hearing reﬂect in essence the constitutive elements of force or coercion in the crime of rape,
characterizing this conduct, in the ﬁrst place, as an act of
rape’.40 With regard to the facts that did not Ôreﬂect in essence
the constitutive elements of force or coercion in the crime of
rape’, such as Ôthe powerlessness of the family members and the

36

Ibid., para. 204.

37

Ibid. It should be noted that the Chamber acknowledged that, at the conﬁrmation hearing, the Prosecutor presented evidence showing not only acts of rape that
would allegedly amount to torture, but also Ômaterial facts other than acts of rape
which he legally characterised as acts of torture’. Ibid., para. 197. However, the
Chamber found that the Prosecutor’s Document Containing the Charges failed to
Ôspecify’ which acts of torture, other than acts of rape, the Prosecutor planned to rely
upon to support his charge of torture as a crime against humanity and held Ôthat the
presentation of partially relevant material facts at the Hearing to support the submission that some acts of torture are diﬀerent from acts of rape [did] not cure the
deﬁciencies and imprecision of the Document Containing the Charges’. Ibid., paras.
206–208. Hence, the Chamber declined to conﬁrm the charge of torture as a crime
against humanity based on acts of torture other than acts of rape. Ibid., para. 209.
38

Ibid., paras. 301–302. Note that the Chamber also declined to conﬁrm the
charge of torture as a war crime, although it based this decision on a ﬁnding that the
Prosecutor failed to properly allege the perpetrator’s speciﬁc intent to inﬂict pain or
suﬀering for a prohibited purpose, as required for the war crime of torture under the
Rome Statute. See ibid., paras. 293–300.
39

Ibid., para. 307.

40

Ibid., para. 310.
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impact on the family members and the CAR population’, the
Chamber determined that these facts were not clearly set out in
the DCC and thus could not be considered by the Chamber in
support of the outrages charge.41 Looking only at the acts of
rape, the Chamber concluded that the Ôessence of the violation
of the law underlying [the relevant] facts is fully encompassed in
the count of rape’ and conﬁrmed the charge of rape as a war
crime, but not outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime.42
B.2 The Bashir Arrest Warrant
17. In contrast to the approach taken by Pre-Trial Chamber II in
the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC permitted the
practice of cumulative charging in the context of the case
against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, even where one
charge was fully subsumed in another charge. Speciﬁcally, in its
ﬁrst decision issuing a warrant of arrest for President Bashir,43
Pre-Trial Chamber I found reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused committed both the crime against humanity of
murder and the crime against humanity of extermination, even
though the Prosecution relied on the same underlying acts in
support of each charge.44 Hence, the Pre-Trial Chamber included both charges in its initial arrest warrant for President
Bashir,45 even though the crime against humanity of murder is

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid., paras. 310–311.

43

The ICC has issued two separate arrest warrants for President Bashir. In the
ﬁrst arrest warrant, Pre-Trial Chamber I found there were reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused had committed various war crimes and crimes against
humanity, but declined to include charges of genocide. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, (Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/
05-01/09-1 (4 March 2010). Following an appeal by the Prosecutor, however, the
Pre-Trial Chamber applied a diﬀerent standard to the genocide charges and found
reasonable grounds to believe the accused had also committed acts of genocide.
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09-95 (12 July 2010). Hence, the Pre-Trial
Chamber issued a second arrest warrant that included the genocide charges. Ibid.
44

Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Decision on the Prosecution’s
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC02/05-01/09-3 (4 March 2009), paras. 95–96.
45

Ibid., at 92.
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fully subsumed within the crime against humanity of extermination where the two crimes are based on the same underlying
acts.
B.3

The Eﬀect of the Bemba Jurisprudence on the General
Acceptance of the Practice of Cumulative Charging
before International Criminal Bodies
18. The Bemba decision on cumulative charging does not aﬀect the
general acceptance of the practice of cumulative charging before
international criminal bodies for two reasons. First, as explained above, the Bemba decision was issued by a single
Pre-Trial Chamber in a single case. Notably, although the
Prosecutor sought leave to obtain interlocutory review of PreTrial Chamber II’s decision before the Appeals Chamber, the
Pre-Trial Chamber denied the Prosecutor’s request.46 Thus, the
decision of the Bemba Chamber has in no way been sanctioned
by the ICC Appeals Chamber. Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chamber
I permitted the practice of cumulative charging in the context of
the Bashir case, suggesting that the Bemba decision is far from
settled law in the context of the ICC.
19. Second, even if the approach of the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber
towards cumulative charging is ultimately adopted by the ICC
as a whole, this fact would not aﬀect the ﬁnding that cumulative
charging is a widely accepted practice before international
criminal bodies. As noted above, the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber
expressly recognized that it was deviating from the practices
both of other international criminal bodies and many national
jurisdictions in disallowing cumulative charging,47 and it justiﬁed that departure on a ﬁnding that Regulation 55 of the ICC’s
Regulations of the Court allows Ôthe Trial Chamber [to]
re-characterise a crime to give it the most appropriate legal
characterization’.48 The validity of this conclusion is itself

46

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘‘Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo)
ICC-01/05-01/08-532 (18 September 2009)’’, paras. 32–35.
47
48

See (n. 30 above) and accompanying text.

Bemba, (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) (n. 26 above),
para. 203.
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questionable, as there is nothing in Regulation 55 requiring
that the Trial Chamber re-characterize the facts where warranted. Rather, the provision states that the Trial Chamber Ômay
change the legal characterisation’ of facts under certain
circumstances.49 Thus, the regulation leaves it to the discretion
of the judges presiding over a particular case whether to recharacterize facts, and those judges could decide not to use
Regulation 55 even in a circumstance where an accused might
otherwise be acquitted. For instance, it is possible that a particular panel of judges will determine that it is the Prosecutor’s
job to prove his case and if he fails to do so, then the accused
should go free. In such a scenario, Regulation 55 does not
protect against acquittals of a guilty individual and thus the
Prosecution may be right to be fearful of a wrongful acquittal if
it does not put forward all possible charges. Furthermore, the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s reliance on Regulation 55 and the Trial
Chamber’s potential ability and willingness to re-characterize
the charges against the accused at some point in the middle of
trial seems inconsistent with the Chamber’s pronouncement that
it was dismissing the so-called Ôcumulative charges’ in order to
reduce the burden on the defense. Most importantly, however,
the fact that there is no equivalent to the ICC’s Regulation 55
under the rules and regulations governing the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon means that it would be inappropriate for the STL
to adopt the reasoning of the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber.
C.

In the Event that the STL Applies the Bemba Approach
to Cumulative Charging, the Tribunal Should Allow Multiple
Charges Based on the Same Evidence Where Each Charge
Contains a Materially Distinct Element, Even If the Same
Evidence is Used to Satisfy Each Charge

20. While the primary recommendation in this brief is that the STL
should broadly permit cumulative charging, we recommend
that, at a minimum, the Tribunal permit multiple charges based
on the same evidence where each charge contains a materially
distinct element. Interestingly, this is the test that the Bemba

49

International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04, R.
55(1), adopted 26 May 2004 (emphasis added).
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Pre-Trial Chamber purported to apply in its decision on the
conﬁrmation of charges.50 However, the Chamber apparently
determined that charges should be deemed inappropriately
Ôcumulative’ even if each charge contains an element materially
distinct from the other if the same evidence is put forth to
establish those elements. Thus, although the crime against
humanity of rape (which requires that the Ôperpetrator invaded
the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration,
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital
opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the
body’ and that the Ôinvasion was committed by force, or by
threat of force or coercion’51) clearly contains elements materially distinct from the crime against humanity of torture (which
requires that the Ôperpetrator inﬂicted severe physical or mental
pain or suﬀering upon one or more persons’ and that Ô[s]uch
person or persons were in the custody or under control of the
perpetrator’52), the Chamber found the charges to be inappropriately cumulative because the same evidence – i.e., acts of rape
– was used to satisfy the elements of both crimes.53
21. Such an approach is unwarranted as both a matter of law and
practice. As an initial matter, nothing in the documents governing the International Criminal Court – or in the documents
governing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – prohibits the
Prosecution from bringing multiple charges against an accused
based on the same underlying conduct. Furthermore, as
explained above,54 permitting multiple charges based on the same
conduct is critical because the multiple charges will enable the
Trial Chamber, where appropriate, to enter multiple convictions
based on that conduct. The ICTY Appeals Chamber described
the practice with respect to cumulative convictions as follows:
multiple convictions entered under diﬀerent statutory provisions, but based
on the same conduct, are permissible… if each statutory provision has a
materially distinct element not contained within the other. An element is
50

See (n. 35 above) et seq. and accompanying text.

51

International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/
Add.2 (2000), Article 7(1)(g)-1.
52

Ibid., Article 7(1)(f).

53

See (n. 37 above) et seq. and accompanying text.

54

See (n. 12 above) et seq. and accompanying text.
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materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by
the other element. Where this test is not met, only the conviction under the
more speciﬁc provision will be entered. The more speciﬁc oﬀence subsumes the
less speciﬁc one, because the commission of the former necessarily entails the
commission of the latter.55

22. The ICTY has also made clear that, in determining whether
cumulative convictions are permissible in a given case, Ôwhat
must be considered are the legal elements of each oﬀence, not the
acts or omissions giving rise to the oﬀence’.56 Thus, for example,
in the Krstic´ case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber overturned the
Trial Chamber’s ﬁnding that convictions for both genocide and
the crime against humanity of extermination, as well as for
genocide and the crime against humanity of persecution, would
be improperly cumulative.57 The Appeals Chamber explained
that simultaneous convictions for genocide and the crime
against humanity of extermination were permissible, even if
based on the exact same conduct, because each crime contained
a materially distinct element (namely, genocide requires Ôthe
intent to destroy, in whole or in part’, a protected group, while
extermination as a crime against humanity Ôrequires proof that
the proscribed act formed a part of a widespread or systematic
attack on the civilian population, and that the perpetrator knew
of this relationship’).58 Similarly, the Appeals Chamber found
that genocide does not subsume the crime against humanity of
persecution, even where the acts constituting persecution are the
same acts constituting genocide, because persecution requires
that the Ôunderlying act form a part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population and that it be
perpetrated with the knowledge of that connection’.59
55

Krstic´, (Appeals Judgment) (n. 13 above), para. 218. See also, Delalic´, et al.,
(Appeals Judgment) supra n. 3, para. 412.
56

Prosecutor v. Kordic´ & Čerkez, (Appeals Judgment) Case No. IT-95-14/2 (17
December 2004), para. 1033 (emphasis added). See also Krstic´, (Appeals Judgment)
(n. 13 above) para. 223 (ÔAs the Appeals Chamber explained, the inquiry into
whether two oﬀences are impermissibly cumulative is a question of law. The fact
that, in practical application, the same conduct will often support a ﬁnding that the
perpetrator intended to commit both genocide and extermination does not make the
two intents identical as a matter of law’.).
57

Krstic´, (Appeals Judgment) (n. 13 above), paras. 227, 229.

58

Ibid., paras. 223–226.

59

Ibid., para. 229.
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23. As explained above, the rationale for permitting cumulative
convictions is that Ômultiple convictions serve to describe the full
culpability of a particular accused or provide a complete picture
of his criminal conduct’.60 In light of this rationale, at the very
least, cumulative charges should be permitted before the STL
where each charge contains a materially distinct element, even if
the same evidence is used to satisfy the elements of each charge.

CONCLUSION
24. For the reasons set out above, the War Crimes Research Oﬃce
respectfully submits that the practice of cumulative charging has
been widely accepted by international criminal bodies, even
where one charge is fully subsumed in another, on the ground
that, prior to trial, it may not be possible to determine exactly
which charges will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and
because multiple charges are necessary to ensure multiple convictions may be entered where warranted to reﬂect the full
criminality of the accused. To the extent that the Appeals
Chamber nevertheless chooses to limit the Prosecution to
bringing multiple charges based on the same underlying acts
only where each charge contains a distinct legal element, it is
respectfully submitted that the Chambers should consider the
legal elements of each charge, not the conduct giving rise to the
charge. Such an approach will help ensure that the ﬁnal judgment against an accused fully reﬂects his or her culpability for
the gravest crimes known to humankind.

60

Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ & Martinovic´, (Appeals Judgment) Case No. IT-98-34 (3
May 2006), para. 585; Brima, et al., (Appeals Judgment) (n. 10 above), para. 215
(quoting the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Naletilic´ & Martinovic´).
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